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TS S C 6 December 1955

DEPUTY DESECTOR/SUPPORT

- 1. The answer to the first question presupposes that Civil Service criteria exclusively will be followed in a forced reduction of manpower. This is evident by the constant reference to establishing "retention registers." It seems to me that this is begging the question and, of all the areas concerned, DD/S should come up with some alternative proposals for a reduction in force.
- 2. Certain of the services that DD/S states would be significantly affected if a 10 per cent reduction were necessary appear to be services that are susceptible of performance by a contractual arrangement, e.g. furniture repairing, typewriter repairing, bus service, custodial service at physical examinations. There, of course, will be a thousand reasons why they shouldn't be done by contract, but are there valid reasons why they can't be done by contract?

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4. In summary, it is my feeling the DD/S's reply is very passive, negative and devoid of imagination.

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- 4. DD/P does not accurately quote the first question that was given them in writing, but states it in a self-serving fashion.
- 5. DD/P states it could save at least positions by elimination of duplication. They go on to say further in answer to question 3. that for FY 1957 they requested overseas positions which were not approved and of this could now be saved by "offsetting reductions that normally occur and elimination of overseas requirements that are no longer valid." Could any of these positions, all of which represent functions, be also saved now over and above the that could be saved by elimination of duplication.
- 6. The DD/P submission is uniformly good and particularly strong in answer to the question on duplication. In answer to question 1. i.e. how they would accomplish their reduction, I find a significant similarity between their proposal and a proposal put forward by this Staff as a recommendation to the DCI in connection with your last Fiscal Year report. It might be interesting to know if the completed "staff package" recommendation you gave the DCI ever was given the DD/P.

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2.

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- 7. DD/I states that his on-duty strength is only three less than his ceiling. I wonder if this represents on-duty strength or on-duty plus in-process people. In answer to the first question my only observation is one man's guess is as good as anothers. Primarily, I plead ignorance with the exception of the Contact Division entry.
- 8. There has been an interesting change of language in answer to the second question. In DD/I's original submission he made the statement that any duplication or overlap that exists did so because of "faulty administration and management." We now have the sematically improved sentence which reads "such duplications and overlaps that exist stem primarily from misapplications of the provisions of existing directives." Also, in answer to the second question the DD/I made with inferential horror a thought that "the DCI would have to rely upon other agencies for substantive support in preparation for NSC briefings." I wonder just how bad an idea this is.
 - 9. The entire content and spirit of the DD/I reply "cannot" in my opinion be attacked on a piecemeal basis, it must be discussed on the basis of philosophy. If DD/I wishes to be all things to all men and if he wishes to control activities not by force of leadership but by actually paying the bill, then he can't be reduced. My only reaction to their whole submission is one which indicates that a complete discussion and evaluation of the role of DD/I should be undertaken by the Director following which some maximum limits of activity should be established.
 - 10. I nominate as the most dangerous man in this Agency the individual behind the thought expressed in Para. 17 of 00-Tab A, and as the most stupid the man most thoughtless enough to sign the Tab.



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